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Abstract. In this paper we design a stream cipher that uses the alge-
braic structure of the multiplicative group ZZ∗p (where p is a big prime
number used in ElGamal algorithm), by defining a quasigroup of order
p− 1 and by doing quasigroup string transformations. The cryptograph-
ical strength of the proposed stream cipher is based on the fact that
breaking it would be at least as hard as solving systems of multivari-
ate polynomial equations modulo big prime number p which is NP-hard
problem and there are no known fast randomized or deterministic algo-
rithms for solving it. Unlikely the speed of known ciphers that work in
ZZ∗p for big prime numbers p, the speed of this stream cipher both in en-
cryption and decryption phase is comparable with the fastest symmetric-
key stream ciphers.
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1 Introduction
From the point of view how encryption algorithms encrypt information that
is repeated several times during the phase of communication, they are divided
on stream ciphers and block ciphers. While block ciphers always give the same
output of cipher texts for the same input blocks of plain text, the stream ciphers
give different outputs for the same sequences of plain text. On the other side,
depending on the type of the keys used in cryptographic algorithm, and the
way the keys are used, there is another classification of encryption algorithms:
symmetric-key and public-key algorithms. Symmetric-key algorithms need the
correspondents in the communication to share a same key that is previously
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exchanged through some secure channel that is out of the scope of the definition
of the algorithm, while in public-key algorithms the problem of exchanging the
communication key is a part of the algorithm and no secure channel is necessary
for that purpose.
Stream cipher algorithms can be either symmetric-key or public-key. Regard-
ing the speed of encryption and decryption procedures, symmetric-key stream ci-
phers are much more faster then public-key ones. That is because the symmetric-
key stream ciphers usually use fast register operations such as shifting, rotation,
and bit by bit logical operations, while the most popular and known public-key
algorithms usually use modular exponentiation. Thus, the public-key algorithms
are around 1000 times slower then symmetric-key algorithms.
A well known public-key stream cipher is Blum-Goldwasser probabilistic
public-key encryption scheme [1]. Even though the speed of that algorithm in
encryption phase is much faster then RSA encryption, the speed of that algo-
rithm in decryption phase is similar or in some cases even slower then the speed
of RSA algorithm, ([2] p. 310-311). In fact the lack of the speed of public-key
stream ciphers is one of the main reasons why they are not widely used in stream
communication.
Diffie-Hellman algorithm was proposed in 1976 [3] and introduced the concept
of public-key cryptography. That algorithm usually is used for establishing a key
exchange between two correspondents, and then, the communication is usually
continued by some symmetric fast algorithm (either block or stream cipher).
In 1985 ElGamal proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on Diffie-Hellman
algorithm [4]. One of the disadvantages of ElGamal algorithm is that cipher text
is two times longer then corresponding plain text, which makes it unsuitable for
using it as a stream cipher.
In this paper beside the theory of finite fields we use also the theory of
quasigroups and Latin Squares. Although quasigroups (or Latin squares) are
used in design of many modern symmetric cryptographic algorithms [5], [6] they
are not in the main stream of cryptographic paradigms. During the last 10 years
several cryptographic algorithms were developed based on quasigroups [7], [8],
[9]. Those algorithms base their security on assumptions that other problems
such as factoring of natural numbers or discrete logarithm problems can not
be solved in polynomial time - and thus have solid theoretical ground for their
security. However, for all of those algorithms, because they usually use sets of
Latin squares (quasigroups), their implementation is several orders of magnitude
slower than other cryptographic algorithms in their category, based usually on
bit manipulation and shifting registers.
Excellent introductory materials about theory of quasigroups the reader can
find in [10] and [11] and some applications of quasigroups and Latin squares in
[12], [13], [14], [15].
In cryptographic algorithms introduced in [16] and [17], and the following
papers [18], [19], [20], [21] and [22] the authors use quasigroups to define so-
called “quasigroup string transformations”. By those algorithms they define a
stream cipher whose principles are used in this paper. For effective encryption
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and decryption, the quasigroup stream cipher uses a set of leaders that are in fact
the secret and symmetric key. However, quasigroups used in those algorithms are
of the order from 16 to 256, and complete multiplicative table have to be known,
before encryption/decryption starts.
In the paper [23] in order to solve the problem of fast generation of a quasi-
groups of order p − 1 where p is a prime number, authors propose a fast way
for generating a quasigroups by knowing only the first row in the multiplicative
table of the quasigroup. That first row is in fact a permutation of the elements
ZZ∗p = ZZp \ {0} = {1, 2, ..., p− 1} and by knowing only that permutation it is
possible to define the product of any two elements such that a quasigroup will
be formed.
In this paper we will define a stream cipher that in its initialization phase
uses ElGamal algorithm, then the encryption is made by using quasigroup string
transformations and the definition of a quasigroup is based by knowing only one
permutation in the set of ZZ∗p.
The organization of the paper is following: In Section 2 we will give basic
definitions of the ElGamal algorithm, quasigroup stream cipher and fast quasi-
group definition from a known permutation. In Section 3 we will define the new
stream cipher and we will give an example with a small value of p, in Section
4 we will examine the cryptographical strength of the proposed stream cipher,
and in Sections 5 we will give the conclusions.
2 Basic definitions
In our description of cryptographic algorithms we will use the usual notification
that the correspondents in the communication are Alice and Bob.
2.1 Basic ElGamal encryption algorithm
The ElGamal encryption algorithm uses a big prime number p, and uses the
operations of modular exponentiation and modular multiplication. There are
three phases of the algorithm: Key generation, Encryption and Decryption. The
algorithm is the following:
Key generation Alice generates her public and private keys as follows:
1. Generate a large random prime number p and a generator α of the mul-
tiplicative group ZZ∗p of the integers {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
2. Select a random integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 2 and compute αamod p.
3. Alice’s public key is the triplet (p, α, αa); Alice’s private key is a.
Encryption Bob encrypts a message m for Alice by doing the following:
1. Obtain Alice’s authentic public key (p, α, αa).
2. Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
3. Select a random integer e, 1 ≤ e ≤ p− 2.
4. Compute γ = αemod p and δ = m · (αa)emod p.
5. Send the ciphertext c = (γ, δ).
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Decryption To recover the message m Alice should do the following:
1. Use the private key a to compute α−ae = γ−a
2. Recover m by computing m = δ · α−aemod p
It is obvious that message expansion in ElGamal algorithm is by factor 2,
because Bob sends the cipher text c = (γ, δ) that has twice the length of the
message m. That fact is considered as a serious disadvantage of the algorithm.
Simple analysis of the algorithms show that in a phase of encryption it uses
two modular exponentiations and one modular multiplication, while in phase
od Decryption it uses one modular exponentiation, one calculation of an inverse
element in multiplicative group ZZ∗p (calculation of the element γ
−1
mod p) and
one modular multiplication. For the security analysis, and security issues about
used prime numbers in ElGamal algorithm the reader can see [2].
2.2 Definition of basic quasigroup string transformations
In this subsection we will give some definitions from the theory of quasigroups
and define a basic quasigroup string transformations. We say “basic” string
transformations, because in [17] much more complex quasigroup string transfor-
mations are defined, but we will not use them in our definition of the stream
cipher.
Definition 1. Let Q = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be a finite set of n elements. A quasi-
group (Q, ∗) is a groupoid satisfying the law
(∀u, v ∈ Q)(∃!x, y ∈ Q) u ∗ x = v & y ∗ u = v. (1)
Given a quasigroup (Q, ∗) a new operation ∗−1 on the set Q can be derived
by:
∗−1(x, y) = z ⇐⇒ x ∗ z = y (2)
It easy to prove the following
Lemma 1. The groupoid (Q, ∗−1) is a quasigroup. ⊓⊔
Instead of the symbol ∗−1 we will use the symbol \ and we will say that
the quasigroup (Q, \) is the left parastrophe (or conjugate in some literature)
adjoint to the quasigroup (Q, ∗).
Then from the definition of \ it follows that
x ∗ y = z ⇐⇒ y = x \ z . (3)
and
x \ (x ∗ y) = y, x ∗ (x \ y) = y. (4)
In what follow we will give basic definitions for quasigroup string transfor-
mations and address several theorems and properties which are proved in [17].
Consider an alphabet (i.e. a finite set) Q, and denote by Q+ the set of all
nonempty words (i.e. finite strings) formed by the elements of Q. The elements
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of Q+ will be rather denoted by a1a2 . . . an than (a1, a2, . . . , an), where ai ∈ Q.
Let ∗ be a quasigroup operation on the set Q, i.e. consider a quasigroup (Q, ∗).
For each a ∈ Q we define two functions ea, da : Q
+ −→ Q+ as follows.
Let ai ∈ Q, α = a1a2 . . . an. Then
ea(α) = b1b2 . . . bn ⇐⇒ b1 = a ∗ a1, b2 = b1 ∗ a2, . . . , bn = bn−1 ∗ an
i.e. bi+1 = bi ∗ ai+1 for each i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, where b0 = a,
and
da(α) = c1c2 . . . cn ⇐⇒ c1 = a ∗ a1, c2 = a1 ∗ a2, . . . , cn = an−1 ∗ an
i.e. ci+1 = ai ∗ ai+1 for each i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, where a0 = a.
a1 a2 . . . an−1 an
a b1 b2 . . . bn−1 bn
 
  ✒
 
  ✒
 
  ✒
 
  ✒
 
  ✒❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of ea function
a a1 a2 . . . an−1 an
b1 b2 . . . bn−1 bn
✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of da function
Definition 2. The functions ea, da are called e- and d- string transformation
of Q+ based on the operation ∗ with leader a.
Note that ea ◦ da = da ◦ ea = 1a i.e. ea and da are mutually inverse string
transformations. A graphical representation of ea and da is shown on Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2. Next we will extend the definition of e- and d- string transformations
with the following
Definition 3. If we choose k leaders a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Q (not necessarily dis-
tinct), then the compositions of mappings
Ek = Ea1...ak = ea1 ◦ ea2 ◦ · · · ◦ eak
and
Dk = Da1...ak = da1 ◦ da2 ◦ · · · ◦ dak
are called E- and D- quasigroup string transformations of Q+ respectively.
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In [17] the following two lemmas are proved:
Lemma 2. The functions Ek and Dk are permutations on Q
+. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. In a quasigroup (Q, ∗), with a given set of k leaders {a1, a2, . . . , ak}
the inverse of Ek = Ea1...ak = ea1 ◦ · · · ◦eak , is E
−1
k = Dak... a1 = dak ◦ · · · ◦ da1 .
Now it is clear that for any quasigroup string transformation E the pair of
functions (E,E−1) can be considered as a pair of an encryption and decryption
function for the strings on an alphabet Q. More formally we give the following
definition of a quasigroup stream cipher:
Definition 4. For a given quasigroup (Q, ∗), and a given k-tuple (a1, a2, . . . , ak),
of leaders ai ∈ Q, the system ((Q, ∗), (a1, a2, . . . , ak), Ea1...ak , Dak...a1) defines a
quasigroup stream cipher on the strings in Q+.
2.3 Definition of a quasigroup of big order p − 1
The construction of a Latin squares is discussed in [9], [12] and [14]. How-
ever, the construction of such Latin squares is not suitable for our purposes
in this paper, because we want to define a quasigroup of order p − 1 where p
is big prime number with more then 1024 bits. That problem can be solved
by the approach that is described in [23]. Namely, if we have a permutation
P =
(
1 2 · · · j · · · p− 1
a11 a12 · · · a1j · · · a1p−1
)
, where (a11, a12, · · · , a1j , · · · , a1p−1) is the first
row of the quasigroup that we want to define, then by defining i∗j = i×a1 j modp
we will define a quasigroup (Q, ∗) of order p− 1.
We will define a permutation of the elements in ZZ∗p by the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For a given prime number p, and a given number K, 1 ≤ K ≤ p−2,
the function fK(j) =
1
1+(K+j) mod (p−1) mod p is a permutation of the elements in
ZZ∗p. ⊓⊔
Now, we can prove the following
Lemma 5. The multiplication operation ∗ defined in the set Q = {1, 2, . . . , p−1}
as:
i ∗ j = i× fK(j) mod p (5)
defines a quasigroup (Q, ∗). ⊓⊔
From the last Lemma, we have the following
Corollary 1. If we define the following function
g(i, j,K) = ((i× j−1 mod p)− 1−K) mod (p− 1) (6)
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that takes the arguments i, j and K from the set {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}, i.e. maps the
set {1, 2, . . . , p−1}3 into the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , p−2} then the left parastrophe (Q, \)
of a quasigroup (Q, ∗) defined by (5) is defined as:
i \ j =
{
g(i, j,K), If g(i, j,K) 6= 0
p− 1, If g(i, j,K) = 0
(7)
⊓⊔
To be consistent with the notation of fK(j), we will use the notation gK(i, j)
instead the notation g(i, j,K). Additional reason for doing that will be offered
in the next section, where once the value of K is chosen, it will remain fixed for
different values of i and j.
3 A quasigroup stream cipher in ZZ∗
p
In this section we will define a quasigroup stream cipher that combines algo-
rithms described in previous section. The algorithm is as follows:
A quasigroup stream cipher
Key generation. Alice generates her public and private keys as follows:
1. Generate a large random prime number p and a generator α of the mul-
tiplicative group ZZ∗p of the integers {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
2. Select a random integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 2 and compute αa modp
3. Alice’s public key is the triplet (p, α, αa); Alice’s private key is a.
Session key generation. Bob wants to establish secure stream channel with
Alice by doing the following:
1. Obtain Alice’s authentic public key (p, α, αa).
2. Select a random integer K, 1 ≤ K ≤ p− 1 by which a quasigroup (Q, ∗)
will be defined for the elements {1, 2, . . . , p− 1} with equation (5).
3. Encrypt K by ElGamal algorithm, obtaining C = (Γ,∆).
4. Select k ≥ 3 random integers ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, 1 ≤ ai ≤ p − 2 to
be leaders for quasigroup stream cipher and encrypt them by ElGamal
algorithm, obtaining Ci = (Γi, ∆i), i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
5. Send Ci.
Establishment of a secure stream cipher. Alice will establish secure stream
channel with Bob by doing the following:
1. Decrypt C by ElGamal decryption procedure, obtaining K by which a
left parastrophe (Q, \) will be defined with equation (7).
2. Decrypt Ci by ElGamal decryption procedure, obtaining the integers
ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, 1 ≤ ai ≤ p − 1 to be leaders for quasigroup stream
cipher.
Stream Encryption. Bob encrypts mesagesmµ from the message streamm1,m2, . . .
by doing the following:
1. Represent every message part mµ as an integer in the range
{0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
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2. Iteratively compute m
(i)
µ = ai ∗m
(i−1)
µ , where m
(0)
µ ≡ mµ, i = 1, . . . , k
and ∗ is quasigroup operation defined by (5).
3. Set cµ = m
(k)
µ and update the values of the leaders by ai = m
(i)
µ , i =
1, . . . , k − 1 and ak = 1 + (
∑k
i=1m
(i)
µ ) mod (p− 1).
4. Send the ciphertext cµ.
Stream Decryption. To decrypt the part cµ of the cipher text stream c1, c2, . . .
Alice should do the following:
1. Obtain cipher text part cµ.
2. Iteratively compute c
(k)
µ = ak \ cµ, c
(i)
µ = ai \ c
(i+1)
µ , i = k− 1, . . . , 1 and
\ is quasigroup operation defined by (7).
3. Recover mµ = c
(1)
µ and update the values of the leaders by ai = c
(i+1)
µ ,
i = k − 1, . . . , 1 and ak = 1 + (cµ +
∑k
i=2 c
(i)
µ ) mod (p− 1).
Example 1. In the following example, we will use relatively small value of the
prime number p, in order to show the work of the algorithm.
Key generation. Alice generates her public and private keys as follows:
1. p = 216 + 1 = 65537 and a generator α = 13 of the multiplicative group
ZZ∗p of the integers {1, 2, . . . , 65536}.
2. She then select a random integer a = 10307 and compute αa mod p =
1310307 mod65537 = 29656
3. Alice’s public key is the triplet (p, α, αa) = (65537, 13, 29656); Alice’s
private key is a = 10307.
Session key generation. Bob wants to establish secure stream channel with
Alice by doing the following:
1. Obtain Alice’s authentic public key (p, α, αa) = (65537, 13, 29656).
2. Select a random integer K = 35469 by which a quasigroup (Q, ∗) will be
defined for the elements {1, 2, . . . , 65536} with equation
i ∗ j = i1+(35469+j) mod 65536mod65537.
3. EncryptK by ElGamal algorithm, obtaining C = (Γ,∆) = (1845, 57308)
(by using the random exponent to be e = 53882).
4. Select k = 3 random integers (a1, a2, a3) = (41866, 44005, 27025) to be
initial leaders for quasigroup stream cipher and encrypt them by El-
Gamal algorithm, obtaining C1 = (Γ1, ∆1) = (13023, 32389), C2 =
(Γ2, ∆2) = (39691, 7691) and C3 = (Γ3, ∆3) = (14791, 21654) (by us-
ing random exponents to be 19495, 7737 and 4256).
5. Send C1, C2 and C3.
Establishment of a secure stream cipher. Alice will establish secure stream
channel with Bob by doing the following:
1. Decrypt C = (Γ,∆) = (1845, 57308) by ElGamal decryption procedure,
obtaining K = 35469 by which a left parastrophe (Q, \) will be defined
with equation (7) i.e. i \ j = ((i× j−1 mod p)− 1−K) mod (p− 1).
2. Decrypt C1 = (Γ1, ∆1) = (13023, 32389), C2 = (Γ2, ∆2) = (39691, 7691)
and C3 = (Γ3, ∆3) = (14791, 21654) by ElGamal decryption procedure,
obtaining the integers (a1, a2, a3) = (41866, 44005, 27025) to be initial
leaders for quasigroup stream cipher.
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Stream Encryption. Bob encrypts messages mµ from the message stream
m1,m2, . . . by doing the following:
1. Suppose that Bob wants to send the following three successive messages
(m1,m2,m3, . . .) = (64816, 47513, 52916, . . .).
2. He iteratively compute m
(1)
1 = a1 ∗m1 = 41866 ∗ 64816 = 6851, m
(2)
1 =
a2 ∗m
(1)
1 = 44005 ∗ 6851 = 44908, m
(3)
1 = a3 ∗m
(2)
1 = 27025 ∗ 44908 =
19753.
3. Set c1 = m
(3)
1 = 19753 and update the values of the leaders by (a1, a2, a3) =
(m
(1)
1 ,m
(2)
1 , 1 + (m
(1)
1 +m
(2)
1 +m
(3)
1 ) mod (p− 1)) = (6851, 44908, 5977).
4. Send the ciphertext c1 = 19753.
5. He then repeats the steps 2.–4. for m2 = 47513 and so on.
Stream Decryption. To decrypt the part cµ of the cipher text stream c1, c2, . . .
Alice should do the following:
1. Obtain cipher text part c1 = 19753.
2. Iteratively compute c
(3)
1 = a3 \ c1 = 27025 \ 19753 = 44908, c
(2)
1 =
a2 \ c
(3)
1 = 44005 \ 44908 = 6851, c
(1)
1 = a1 \ c
(2)
1 = 41866 \ 6851 = 64816.
3. Recover m1 = c
(1)
1 = 64816 and update the values of the leaders by a2 =
c
(3)
1 = 44908, a1 = c
(2)
1 = 6851 and a3 = 1+(c1+c
(3)
1 +c
(2)
1 ) mod (p−1) =
1 + (19753 + 44908 + 6851) mod (p− 1) = 5977.
4. She then repeats the steps 2. and 3. for c2 and so on.
4 Cryptographical strength of the quasigroup stream
cipher in ZZ∗
p
The proposed algorithm has two parts. The first part is the part that is ElGamal
algorithm, and the cryptographical strength of that part is based on the strength
of ElGamal algorithm i.e. on cryptographical strength of Diffie-Helman algorithm
which further relies its security on intractability of Discrete Logarithm Problem.
The second part is the part where fast stream cipher transformations are
performed using k leaders that are unknown for an adversary. In what follows
we will examine the cryptographical strength of the stream cipher depending on
the number of leaders k. We will assume that the quasigroup stream cipher is
broken if the adversary find some of the symetric parts of the stream i.e. if he
find somehow the number K which defines the permutation in ZZ∗p or any of the
initial leaders a1, a2, . . . , ak.
4.1 The case k = 1
Let k = 1, and let suppose that the adversary have one pair of known plaintext
and ciphertext (M,C) = (m1,m2,m3, . . . , c1, c2, c3, . . .). By having that infor-
mation he will try to obtain some knowledge about the value K which defines
the quasigroup (Q, ∗) and about the initial leader a1. From the definition of the
algorithm it follows that c1 = a1 ∗m1 and c2 = c1 ∗m2, i.e.
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{
c1 =
a1
1+(K+m1) mod (p−1)
mod p
c2 =
c1
1+(K+m2) mod (p−1)
mod p
where a1 and K are not known. The last system can be reduced to a quadratic
polynomial equation with one unknown K in the field ZZp. Such type of univari-
ate quadratic polynomial equations can be easily solved for any prime number p
([24] p.37). So, if the number of used leaders is k = 1 the stream cipher is easily
breakable.
4.2 The case k = 2
For the case when k ≥ 2 we will make an analysis of the strength of the al-
gorithm by assuming that adversary can apply the chosen plaintext attack, i.e.
we will assume that the adversary knows what is the outcome from encryp-
tion of the plaintext stream where all messages mi = p − 2, i = 1, 2, . . . i.e. he
knows the following pair of plaintext and ciphertext: (M,C) = (p− 2, p− 2, p−
2, p−2, . . . , c1, c2, c3, c4 . . .). With that special case, the equations for quasigroup
transformations are simplified since for any c ∈ ZZ∗p,
c ∗ (p− 2) = c× fK(p− 2) modp =
c
1 + (K + p− 2) mod (p− 1)
mod p =
c
K
modp
We will make an additional assumption, in order to simplify the equations
that have to be solved. Namely, instead of complicated usage of modulo p and
modulo p − 1 in the obtained equations, we will only use operations modulo p.
Although the solutions for those equations are not necessary solutions for the
real equations involving modulo p and modulo p − 1, we will show that even
those simplified equations are hard to solve if the number of used leaders k is
sufficiently large.
So, by mentioned simplifications and assumptions, for k = 2 the adversary
will obtain the following system of equations in ZZp:

c1 =
a2
1+
a1
K
+K
c2 =
c1+
a1
K
1+
a1
K2
+K
c3 =
c2+
a1
K2
1+
a1
K3
+K
The last system can be reduced to the following univariate polynomial equa-
tion of degree 3 in ZZp with unknown variable K:
c3K
3 + (−2 c2 + c3 − c2 c3) K
2 +
(
c1 − c2 + c2
2
)
K + c2 c3 − c1 c3 = 0
For those type of polynomials there are efficient (running in polynomial time)
randomized algorithms for solving them in ZZ∗p (see for example [24] p.37, p.123-
p.132).
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So, we could say that the case with two leaders i.e. when k = 2 when the
equations are simplified and we only work modulo p, can be successfully attacked
by the chosen plaintext attack.
We are not aware if there are some known randomized or deterministic algo-
rithms for solving equations that involve both modulo p and modulo p−1 which
is much complicated and harder to solve case, but taking conservative approach,
we will consider that the case k = 2 is not safe.
4.3 The case k = 3
For the case when k = 3, and by supposing that a possible adversary have one
pair of known chosen plaintext and ciphertext (M,C) = (p− 2, p− 2, p− 2, p−
2, . . . , c1, c2, c3, c4 . . .), he can obtain the following system of simplified equations:


c1 =
a3
1+K+
a2
1+
a1
K
+K
c2 =
c1+
a1
K
+
a2
1+
a1
K
+K
1+K+
a2
(1+ a1
K2
+K) (1+ a1K +K)
c3 =
c2+
a1
K2
+
a2
(1+ a1
K2
+K) (1+ a1K +K)
1+K+
a2
(1+ a1
K3
+K) (1+ a1
K2
+K) (1+ a1K +K)
c4 =
c3+
a1
K3
+
a2
(1+ a1
K3
+K) (1+ a1
K2
+K) (1+ a1K +K)
1+K+
a2
(1+ a1
K4
+K) (1+ a1
K3
+K) (1+ a1
K2
+K) (1+a1K +K)
If we introduce two new variables A1 =
a1
K
and A2 =
a2
1+
a1
K
+K
we can reduce
the above system to the system of two bivariate polynomial equations:{
P1(K,A1) = 0
P2(K,A1) = 0
where in the first polynomial P1, the degree of K is 7, and the degree of A1 is
3, and in the second polynomial P2, the degree of K is 12 and the degree of A1
is 5.
It is clear that if we continue several more steps, with a usage of several
more leaders, the complexity of the system to be solved would increase even
more. Although the obtained equations have specific structure we can ask the
following question: Are there any fast (in polynomial time, deterministic or ran-
domized) algorithms for solving systems of multivariate polynomials modulo big
prime number p. We can try to find the answer in the results of modern Number
Theory. Namely, two areas of research are connected with posted question: 1.
Factorization of multivariate polynomials modulo prime number and 2. Solving
systems of multivariate polynomials modulo prime number. Although in the last
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decades we see dramatic breakthrough in factorization of multivariate polyno-
mials modulo prime numbers (see for example [25], [26], [27], [28] and [29]), and
in some cases the results of that breakthrough increase our knowledge how to
solve systems of multivariate polynomials modulo prime number, it was shown
that finding the roots of systems of multivariate polynomials modulo big prime
number p is equivalent to solving an NP-hard problem (see [30] and [31]).
From above discussion, we can say that we have strong evidence that breaking
the proposed stream cipher would be as hard as solving in polynomial time some
NP-hard problem.
5 Conclusions and further directions
In these conclusions, we would like to say something about the speed of the
proposed stream cipher. For every block mµ and cµ both in encryption and de-
cryption phase k modular multiplications and k modular calculations of inverse
element are needed, but doesn’t need operations of modular exponentiation. If
we have in mind that modular multiplication and modular division operations
modulo p can be implemented in O(log22 p), that means that total number of op-
erations have complexity of O(k log22 p). In other words, calculated as operations
per byte, the proposed stream cipher is much faster then cryptographic algo-
rithms that work over ZZ∗p, and can approach the speed of fast symmetric-key
stream ciphers. However, the benefits for using the proposed stream cipher are
that its cryptographic strength is equivalent as solving in polynomial time (with
deterministic or with randomized algorithm) NP-hard problems.
From other point of view, the proposed stream cipher tries to bridge the gap
between fast symmetric-key algorithms and slow public-key algorithms, using
the flexibility of key-exchange possibilities of the public-key algorithms, and the
speed of symmetric-key algorithms. The mathematical structure of the domain
of encoded messages is the same in both parts, i.e. the transformations are done
in the set of ZZ∗p = ZZp \ {0} = {1, 2, ..., p− 1}.
In practical implementation, in order to avoid the common disadvantage
of all public-key algorithms that is the expansion of the original message first
in the process of transformation of a message m into an integer from the set
{1, 2, . . . , p − 1} and then in the process of encryption, we should implement
the proposed algorithm with a prime number p which has the form of a Fermat
prime number Fn = 2
2n + 1. However, for n = 3, and n = 4 the prime numbers
F3 = 257 and F4 = 65537 are too small for cryptographic purposes, and there
are no prime Fermat numbers for n > 4. To overcome that disadvantage we
propose the use of a prime numbers of the form pl = 2
8l + 3. For example p98,
p213, and p251 are prime numbers with 784, 1704 and 2008 bits respectfully. For
example let suppose that we use a prime number p251 with 2008 bits. Then, in
the process of message transformation, we could simply treat every consecutive
2008 bits i.e. 251 bytes as an input message and to add one extra byte that will
be in fact the total message expansion.
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